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Summary of Arguments1 
Respondent is entitled to the separate property he was gifted during the course of 
marriage. It is undisputed that the five parcels of land at issue here (the "Subject 
Properties") were paid for by Respondent's mother and given to him as a gift. Thus, the 
district court incorrectly determined that the Subject Properties were not really a gift, but 
considered earnings. Indeed, there was no factual or legal basis for any of the 
conclusions the district court relied upon to label and divide the Subject Properties as 
marital. 
In regard to Petitioner's Cross-Appeal, Petitioner has set forth no basis whatsoever 
to overturn the district court's rulings relating to Respondent's gifted LLC interest or the 
disposition of certain bulls. Petitioner has inadequately briefed these issues, and in any 
event, offers no reason for reversal. In addition, Petitioner sets forth no basis for 
disturbing the manner in which the district court divided the Subject Properties, though 
Respondent respectfully urges that this issue should be rendered moot by reversal of the 
determination that the Subject Properties were marital assets in the first place. 
1
 In the Brief of Appellee, pp. 7-12, Petitioner sets forth a purported "Factual Background." 
Respondent objects to the same to the extent: (1) it relies upon facts not in evidence at trial in this 
matter, to wit, the affidavit Petitioner filed in response to a motion for summary judgment, see 
Brief of Appellee, p. 4; and (2) contains argument rather than factual statements. Respondent 
concurs with Petitioner's "Factual Background" to the extent it sets forth the five parcels of 
property at issue in this appeal (the "Subject Properties"), all of which were purchased with fiinds 
provided by Bernice Kunzler for the Respondent, and the district court's determinations 
regarding the Subject Property and other assets. Respondent otherwise relies on the 
"Background" statement set forth in his opening brief. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-4. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
A. RESPONDENT'S APPEAL. 
I. The District Court Improperly Divided the Subject Properties. 
Respondent's appeal focuses solely on the district court's decision to treat the 
Subject Properties as marital property and divide them accordingly. At this stage of the 
briefing, it appears sensible to review the points on which the parties agree, and then 
analyze where they diverge. 
The parties agree that the Subject Properties were purchased with funds provided 
by Bernice Kunzler, Respondent's mother ("Bernice"), and were titled in Respondent's 
name, either alone or with certain siblings. See Brief of Appellee, p. 9; R. 1349-54 
("Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"). During 
Respondent's case in chief at trial, Bernice testified specifically that, as part of her estate 
planning, she had paid for each of the Subject Properties transferred to her various 
children. See TT2, pp. 71-72. In addition, Bernice testified at trial regarding her intent to 
gift the Subject Properties to Respondent, and not Petitioner: 
Q. Mrs. Rous [Kunzler], have you ever transferred interest in any property 
or deeded any property to spouses of your children? 
A. I have not. 
Q. And why not? 
A. Because this is something Chet [her husband] and I built. We built it 
5 
for our children. We intend it to stay with our children. 
M , p . 73. 
It is from this point that the parties' perspectives diverge. Respondent argues that, 
based on these facts, the district court erred when it determined that the Subject Properties 
were "not gifts but entitlements earned during the marriage." R. 1355 ("Amended 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"). Petitioner argues that the 
district court's decision was based upon sufficient record evidence to withstand appellate 
review. Utah law regarding the division of separate and marital property indicates that 
Respondent's argument should prevail. 
While "[a] trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] in 
a divorce proceeding," Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, \ 17,45 P.3d 176 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), its property "distribution must 
be based upon adequate factual findings and must be in accordance with the standards set 
by this state's appellate courts," Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
In this case, the Court begins with the premise that "trial courts making 'equitable' 
property division pursuant to [Utah Code] section 30-3-5 should...generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage...to that 
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value." Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); see also Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 
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373,If 26, 993 P.2d 887, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) ("Generally, in a divorce 
proceeding each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and 
fifty percent of the marital property." (internal quotations and citation omitted)); 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App.1994) ( "[E]ach party should, in 
general, receive the real and personal property he or she brought to the marriage or 
inherited during the marriage." (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
As an exception to this general rule, it is recognized that premarital property loses 
its separate identity and becomes part of the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by 
his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of 
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges." Oliekan v. Oliekan, 
2006 UT App 405, If 20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308). 
This Court has also recognized that the presumption regarding separate property 
"does not supersede the trial court's broad equitable power to distribute marital property." 
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, \ 26, 993 P.2d 887, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 
(Utah 2000). However, as this Court recently observed in Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App 
394 (mem.), "there is an order to this process'" id. at f 5 (emphasis added): 
In distributing property in a contested divorce proceeding, "the court should 
first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or 
as the separate property of one or the other." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 
1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). The court should then 
recognize the presumption that "[e]ach party is ... entitled to all of his or her 
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id. The court 
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may, however, then deviate from the presumptive rule if it finds and 
articulates "exceptional circumstances" warranting such a departure. Id. 
Trial courts must follow this "systematic approach" when making property 
division determinations. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, If 24, 9 P.3d 
171. 
Id. (emphasis in original). In Hodge, the district court "essentially skipped the first two 
steps prescribed by Burt and Kelley." Id. at If 6. In this case, it appears that these steps 
were ignored in their entirety. 
There is no dispute that the Subject Properties were purchased solely with non-
marital funds and were titled in Respondent's name, along with his siblings. There is also 
no dispute that Bernice intended the Subject Properties to be a gift to Respondent and his 
siblings. See Brief of Appellee, p. 20 ("when purchasing the [Subject Properties] Alan 
Kunzler fs mother intended [the properties] to be gifts and/or inheritance and that Allison 
Kunzler receive nothing.") Accordingly, such property should have been initially 
classified as Respondent's separate property. See Hodge, 2007 UT App 394 at f^ 5; see 
also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 1987) (holding that real property 
inherited by wife was separate property, subject to distribution exceptions recognized 
under Utah law); Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 305-09 (describing gift of shares in farm 
corporation as separate property, though subject to equitable distribution in discrete 
cases); Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (mem.) (upholding district court 
determination that real property purchased by non-marital assets and titled solely in wife's 
name was separate property.). 
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Nevertheless, the district court ruled from the outset that the Subject Properties 
were part of the marital estate. The basis for this determination is unclear. The only 
findings related to this matter state, in relevant part: 
The Court finds the money to purchase parcels of real property titled 
in the name of Respondent came from income generated by Kunzler Ranch, 
which at that time was Bemice Kunzler, dba Kunzler Ranch. 
The Court finds prior to the creation of the Kunzler Ranch L.L.C. in 
approximately 1996, Bernice Kunzler and the Kunzler Ranch were one and 
the same entity and bank account. 
The only income which the Kunzler Ranch generated following the 
death of Bernice Kunzler's husband...was a result of the labor of 
Respondent and his brothers. Respondent's mother testified that "Dean and 
the daughters would receive less but that is because the boys on the ranch 
have been there and have worked it." Additionally, Bernice Kunzler 
testified, "These kids that live in town will not receive as much, they will 
get benefits from their work, so that is why the boys on the ranch will 
receive more." 
The Court finds the daughters and son who have chosen to make 
their careers in the city will have benefits from their employment including 
40IK plans or pension/retirement plans. The only pension or retirement 
which most farmers and ranchers have is the value of the land which they 
have acquired. The Court therefore finds it makes sense that those who 
have stayed and worked the ranch receive a greater share. The greater share 
is not truly a gift, rather it is something that has been earned. The 
Respondent touched briefly on this concept of gift vs. entitlement in his 
own testimony. Specifically, the Respondent referred to a saddle which had 
been given by him to one of the parties' sons and then Respondent corrected 
himself and said, "It wasn't really even a gift, he had earned it." 
The Court finds the interest which has been "earned" during the 
marriage ought to be considered a marital asset just the same as any pension 
which might be divisible under the Woodward formula. 
R. 1347-48. 
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Based upon these findings, the district court made the following, ubiquitous 
conclusion: 
The Court finds all interests awarded to the Petitioner in the 
foregoing paragraphs have been because the properties were either (a) not 
gifts but entitlements earned during the marriage, or (b) acquired or 
enhanced through the joint efforts of both Petitioner and Respondent, or © 
have been commingled. 
R. 1355. 
The only conclusion referenced in the district court's findings is the determination 
that the Subject Properties were "not gifts but entitlements earned during the maniage." 
Moreover, this was the only conclusion for which the district court cited any purported 
support in the record. However, this conclusion has no support in the record.2 
As set forth herein and in Respondent's opening brief, Bernice gave no testimony 
at trial that the Subject Properties were "not gifts but entitlements earned during the 
marriage." Rather, her testimony was to the contrary. Nevertheless, the district court 
appears to have based its entire ruling that such property was marital on - at best - an 
inference it apparently made from Bernice's testimony. This ruling should be reversed. 
2
 Petitioner raises the issue of marshaling in her appeal brief. Petitioner asserts that Respondent 
failed to address her affidavit filed previously in response to a motion for summary judgment. 
See Brief of Appellee, Addendum "A." The contents of this affidavit were not testified to by 
Petitioner at trial Indeed, none of the allegations contained therein can be found in the 
testimony she provided at trial; thus, such allegations were not subject to cross-examination. 
Accordingly, Respondent has no duty to "marshal" such allegations, because they are not facts in 
evidence at trial. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, % 11, 51 P.3d 724 ("in order to 
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists.") (emphasis added). 
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Bemice's direct testimony described her purchase of the Subject Properties, and 
her intent regarding the transfer thereof. See TT2, pp. 71-73. She also made clear that 
neither Respondent nor any of his siblings contributed any of their own money to said 
purchases. See id. at p. 72, lines 22-25. On cross-examination, Petitioner's trial counsel 
failed to refute or draw any conflicting testimony regarding these assertions. Instead, 
counsel asked a number of essentially irrelevant questions regarding whether Bernice 
thought her gifts were "fair." It is not even apparent that this line of questioning had 
anything to do with the Subject Properties, but instead posed questions regarding the 
LLC: 
Q. Okay. The two LLC's that were formed, do you feel that that - that the 
forming of those two LLC's were fair as far as treating your kids 
equally? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. You do? 
A. I do. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall your deposition being taken? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And do you recall what you indicated on that occasion when I 
asked you that question? 
A. Yes. I think I told you that perhaps Dean, my son that lived in 
Tremonton, and my daughters received less. But I take into account, 
too, that my boys on the ranch have been there working on the ranch. 
Q. Okay. 
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A. And didn't live in town, didn't have more - how do I say it? They get 
their health insurance paid for. Reed helped me go through that. 
TT2, pp. 76-77. Over objections from Respondent's counsel, Petitioner's counsel then 
attempted to use the purported transcript of said deposition to impeach or challenge such 
statements. However, the purported transcript was never introduced into evidence, see 
id,, p. 79, lines 19-22, was not used for any other evidentiary purpose except to 
purportedly refresh Petitioner's recollection of what she said during that deposition, and, 
in any event, procured no other relevant testimony. Instead, Bernice was simply asked to 
read the following from the purported deposition transcript: 
Q. Please read that part. 
A. "Why was there a decision to split up - to have your daughters and Dean 
receive or deal with the Cache County property and then you had your 
other three boys remain in the Park Valley Property? Why was that 
decision made? Well, it just seemed the thing to do. They grew up 
there. These kids were in town. It was an easier way to separate it. Do 
you feel that it was an equalized separation for your children? You 
have several factors - you have to take several factors into 
consideration." You said, "Okay. Tell me about those facts. These kids 
that live in town probably are not inheriting , will not inherit, as much 
as my sons that work on the ranch. They live and work where they 
receive benefits. So that just seemed to be an easier way to do it." 
Q. If I may approach, Your Honor, there's another portion I'd like her to 
read. 
[Court]. All right. Well, before you have her read another part, are you 
going to ask her if that refreshes her memory as to that first part? I 
don't want to get too many pages going here. 
Q. Do you recall making that statement? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And that refreshes your memory about what was said earlier in April, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Thank you... 
M a t pp. 80-81. 
Solely on the basis of the foregoing, the district court determined that Bernice did 
not intend to transfer the Subject Properties as a gift, but as earnings of some sort. That 
ruling simply cannot be sustained. It is, at best, an inference made from the foregoing 
statements. However, these statements do not support such a finding; they do not state 
that Bernice intended to transfer the Subject Properties as anything other than a gift. 
Whatever her personal reasons were for making the gift, the direct, undisputed testimony 
is that such a gift was, in fact, made. See 38 Am Jur 2d Gifts, § 18 ("The donor's 
motivation for making the gift, or the wisdom of making it, is irrelevant to the question of 
whether he or she possessed the requisite donative intent."). Accordingly, the district 
court's determination that the Subject Properties were marital property because they 
should be viewed as "earnings" is not supported by the record and should be reversed. 
Petitioner seems to argue that, even if this is true, the district court's ruling should 
be sustained because the Subject Properties were converted in some manner from 
Petitioner's separate property to marital property. However, there are no findings, and no 
evidence to support this conclusion. 
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As noted above, the district court entered what amounts to a "catch-all" conclusion 
that states the Subject Properties "were either (a) not gifts but entitlements earned during 
the marriage, or (b) acquired or enhanced through the joint efforts of both Petitioner and 
Respondent, or © have been commingled." R. 1355. Conclusions (b) and © are not 
supported with any findings by the Court. This is because there is no evidence or factual 
findings to support such a conclusion. 
A district court's failure "to make findings on all material issues is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The findings must show "that the court's 
judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence," and 
"should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps 
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id. (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). No findings were made by the trial court to support the 
conclusion that the Subject Properties were "acquired or enhanced through the joint 
efforts of both Petitioner and Respondent," R. 1355, and this conclusion in no way flows 
"logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078. 
It is telling that, in regard to the argument that record support exists for the 
conclusion that the property was enhanced through "joint efforts," Petitioner relies almost 
exclusively on an affidavit she filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See 
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Brief of Appellee, pp. 16-18 and Addendum 1. This affidavit is not part of the trial 
record. Petitioner's testimony at trial makes no reference to the assertions set forth in the 
affidavit. Accordingly, these statements could not form a basis for the district court's 
determination. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, Tf 11, 51 P.3d 724 ("in order to 
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." (emphasis added)). 
Thus, the only testimony upon which Petitioner relies for the proposition that she 
contributed to or enhanced the Subject Properties is the following: 
Q. So during the time that you lived in Park Valley what was a typical -
what was the typical daily routine, or even yearly routine, as far as the 
ranch operation and whatnot? 
A. Alan was gone a lot. They had cows all over the place. Up in Logan 
Canyon and in Idaho. We've had some in Nevada and Wyoming and 
Colorado and he'd have to go with the cows there. He was gone a lot. 
In fact, there was a few years there that I added it up and he was only 
home five months of the year. 
Q. And you indicated he was gone quite a bit? 
A. He was. 
Q. Okay. So who took care of the household issues? 
A. I did 
Q. The children and whatnot? 
A. I did. 
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Q. Okay. 
A. I would even have laundry sent home on a semi and I had [sic] go up 
and meet the semi and get his laundry and bring it home and wash and 
dry it as fast as I could before the next semi came through with the next 
load that they were sending from Logan, then send them clean clothes 
back to him. 
Q. And this was for - where was he in Logan? 
A. Up Logan Canyon gathering calves in the fall. 
Q. Okay. So you would indicate to the court that you assumed most of the 
domestic responsibilities during your marriage because he was 
working? 
A. Yes. 
TT1, p. 12, lines 15-23; p. 76, lines 6-23. 
There is no dispute that Petitioner took care of the domestic responsibilities related 
to the household. However, there is no evidence that could support the district court's 
conclusion that the Subject Properties were "acquired or enhanced through the joint 
efforts of both Petitioner and Respondent." See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
308 (Utah 1988) (holding that property inherited during marriage is properly awarded as 
separate property unless "the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed 
to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property") (emphasis added); Burt 
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("such property may appropriately be 
considered part of the marital estate, subject to division, when the other spouse has by his 
or her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or donated property") 
16 
(emphasis added); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) ("defendant concedes 
that he made no contribution toward the increase in value of the acreage in question and 
that the income derived solely from the effects of inflation on land values"); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (mem.) ("We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments that 
his purported efforts - including doing some tile work in the home and 'supervising' 
landscaping and home theater installation - were sufficient to obtain an equitable interest 
in the home."); c.f. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, If 24, 45 P.3d 176 (holding that 
wife was entitled to share of corporate assets where "Wife not only managed the 
household, but also grew the parties' marital properties."); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 
1318 (wife had "performed bookkeeping and secretarial services without pay for the 
corporation."). 
Accordingly, the district court's conclusion regarding contribution to the Subject 
Properties should be reversed. 
Similarly, the district court's conclusion that the Subject Properties have in some 
way been commingled is without basis and should be reversed. There is no finding by the 
Court that could support such a conclusion, and the conclusion is without support in the 
record. Accordingly, this conclusion should be reversed. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (holding that failure of the district court "to make findings 
on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.") 
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In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, this Court made the following observation, 
particularly relevant here: 
Even though defendant's inheritance is readily traceable and has not been 
commingled, plaintiff argues that defendant's inherited funds have 
substantially changed in form - they were received as cash but have become 
stocks, bonds and real estate - and therefore they should be considered part 
of the marital estate. Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the Court stated 
that property which had lost its "identity through commingling or 
exchanges" could properly be considered part of the marital estate. 760 P.2d 
at 308. We disagree with plaintiffs reading of Mortensen. The thrust of 
Mortensen is not whether the mere form of property has changed, but 
whether it has lost its "identity" as separate property. Id. The separate 
character of the defendant's inheritance has been maintained in segregated 
accounts and portfolios and the home she purchased.... To accept plaintiffs 
view of Mortensen would unreasonably discourage the prudent investment 
of inherited funds. In order to preserve the property's separate character, the 
donee or heir would be required to maintain the property in the same 
physical form in which it was received, be it securities, real estate, or cash. 
The law does not require such economic absurdity. 
Id. at 1169 (emphasis added). 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that could support the district 
court's conclusion that the Subject Properties were, in any fashion, commingled with 
marital assets. As set forth above, the Subject Properties were purchased with Bemice's 
funds; Respondent did not contribute any money, let alone marital funds, to the same. 
SeeTTl, pp. 71-73. 
Petitioner points to various references in the transcript in an attempt to show some 
record support for the district court's holding. However, Petitioner utterly fails to show 
that marital assets were, in any way, commingled with the Subject Properties. Petitioner 
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cites TT2, p. 76 for the proposition that "the money Alan earned went into the Ranch 
account.9' Brief of Appellee, p. 18. There is no such testimony on the page referenced. 
Nevertheless, even if that statement had been made, it would not affect and has no 
bearing on the disposition of the Subject Properties? The same is true for the remaining 
statements cited by Petitioner - they are irrelevant to the issue of whether the Subject 
Properties were, in some way, commingled with marital property. C.f. Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Even though Husband used 
inherited funds to pay the down payment on the building, he used substantial marital 
funds to maintain and augment that asset. We find no error in the court's determination 
that the appreciated portion of the asset changed its character from a personal asset to a 
marital asset.") 
Accordingly, the district court's conclusion should be reversed. The district court 
failed to make any factual finding in support of its conclusion that the Subject Properties 
were marital due to non-described "commingling." Further, the facts of record are 
certainly not "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of 
the judgment." Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078. 
In sum, each of the three conclusions upon which the district court determined that 
the Subject Properties were marital property should be reversed. Only one of these 
3Indeed, throughout her brief, Petitioner consistently conflates the identity of Bemice, the LLC, 
the gifted Subject Properties, and Respondent himself, in order to show that "commingling" 
occurred in some fashion or to some degree. However, there is no evidence that there was any 
commingling of marital assets and the Subject Properties, the relevant issue herein. 
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conclusions is based on any findings, and none of them are supported by the record. As a 
result, Respondent requests that this Court reverse this determination and award the 
Subject Properties to Respondent. 
B. PETITIONER'S CROSS-APPEAL. 
I. District Court Properly Awarded Respondent His Gifted 
Interest in the LLC. 
Petitioner argues that the district court erred when it determined that Respondent's 
20.37% interest in Kunzler Ranch LLC, which asset was gifted to Respondent by Bernice, 
was not a marital asset. Petitioner fails to show how or why the district court committed 
error. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) states that the argument in the appellants brief 
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not 
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and 
parts of the record relied on. 
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Petitioner's argument fails to comply with rule 24(a)(9). Appellant sets forth no 
authorities or statutes to assist the Court and provides no analysis. Instead, Petitioner 
merely asserts that, because the district court awarded the Subject Properties as marital 
property, it should have made the same distribution with other gifted assets. Thus, 
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Appellant has "impermissibly shifted the burden of analysis to the reviewing court in this 
case." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,«[[ 9, 995 P.2d 14. 
Even if the Court determines the analysis is adequate under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(9), Respondent fails to provide the Court with any reason to overturn the 
district court's findings in regard to the LLC. To the contrary, Respondent provides the 
very reason to affirm, when she states: 
When forming the LLC and when purchasing the [Subject Properties], Alan 
Kunzler's mother intended both to be gifts and/or inheritance and that 
Allison Kunzler receive nothing. 
Brief of Appellee, p. 20 (citing TT2, p. 73). Based on this and other facts, the district 
court made specific findings related to Respondent's gifted interest in the LLC, see R. 
1355-6, and properly awarded Respondent his separate property. See Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (holding trial court should "generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage...to that 
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value.") 
Respondent sets forth no facts that contradict the district court's decision, let alone 
facts sufficient to overcome the requisite burden when challenging district court findings. 
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 76, 100 P.3d 1177 ("In order to challenge a court's 
factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even 
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." (internal quotations and 
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citation omitted.)) 
Of course, Respondent shares Petitioner's concern set forth at page 20 of her brief: 
The first problem with the trial court's reliance on these facts is that, 
with the exception of the fact that the real property in Kunzler Ranch was 
owned by Alan Kunzler's parents, the facts are identical to the facts upon 
which the court relied in finding that the [Subject Properties] are marital 
assets. 
Brief of Appellee, p. 20. This fundamental inconsistency is, in essence, the basis for 
Respondent's fervent challenge to the district court's disposition of the Subject 
Properties; a problem that can be resolved by reversing the decision to divide the Subject 
Properties. 
II. Petitioner Fails to Show District Court Error in the Manner of 
Distribution of the Subject Properties. 
Petitioner challenges the district court's failure to divide the Subject Property in a 
manner not requested at trial. Respondent is obviously of the view point that this 
argument should be considered moot, due to the improper distribution of such assets in 
the first instance. For purposes of responding to the Cross-Appeal, Respondent argues 
that Petitioner received precisely what she asked for - an interest in each of the Subject 
Properties. She has set forth no basis for this Court to disrupt that remedy. 
At trial, Petitioner's counsel argued, "[W]ith regard to the land that he holds 
individually and the land held jointly, we would indicate that as a matter of law she's 
entitled to a half-interest in that." TT2, p. 157, lines 24-25; p. 158, line 1. The district 
court obliged this request, concluding that Petitioner was entitled to one half of 
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Respondent's interest in each Subject Property. See R. 1349-1354. Petitioner now claims 
that, rather than an ownership interest in these parcels, she is entitled to a monetary award 
in lieu thereof. The problem in providing such a remedy is that Petitioner set forth no 
evidence below of the value of the Subject Properties. Moreover, many of the Subject 
Properties are owned by two or more individuals, which would add additional 
complications to the determination of an alternate remedy. 
Ultimately, Petitioner's argument fails because she sets forth no basis for 
overturning this award or for remand. Thus, in the event that this Court affirms the 
district court's decision to divide the Subject Properties, the remedy awarded should be 
sustained. 
III. District Court Properly Denied Petitioner an Interest in the 
LLC's Bulls. 
Last, Petitioner argues that the district court erred when it found that certain bulls 
were the property of the LLC, rather than marital properties subject to division. Once 
again, Petitioner has failed to comply with rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and this argument should be summarily denied. In any event, Petitioner has 
set forth no reason, whether legal or factual, for this Court to overturn the district court's 
decision. 
The sole finding on disposition of the bulls was as follows: 
The Court heard evidence regarding bulls owned by Respondent. 
Respondent testified that the sole reason for placing these bulls in his name 
was so that he would receive benefits from the Angus Breeders Association 
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in the form of magazines and newsletters. The Court finds there is some 
evidence that the Respondent acquired ownership of some of the animals, 
but it appears more likely the bulls are the property of Kunzler Ranch LLC. 
R. 1346-47. Petitioner fails to give this Court any reason to overturn the district court's 
determination, except to note that said decision is "diametrically opposed" to the district 
court's determination regarding the Subject Properties. Brief of Appellee, p. 24. 
Accordingly, there is no basis to overturn the district court's factual finding on this point. 
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,176. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent should have been awarded the separate property he was gifted during 
the course of marriage. This includes the Subject Properties, which were paid for by 
Respondent's mother, were given to him as a gift, and were not transmuted in some 
fashion into marital property. Respondent has shown that the district court incorrectly 
determined that the Subject Properties were marital property, and has shown that the 
district court's conclusions in this regard have no evidentiary support in the record. 
On the other hand, Petitioner has set forth no basis whatsoever to overturn the 
district court's rulings relating to Respondent's gifted LLC interest, the disposition of the 
LLC's bulls, or the manner in which the district court divided the Subject Properties. 
Accordingly, Respondent respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the 
district court's determination and division of the Subject Properties as marital property, 
and should otherwise affirm. 
24 
DATED this _/£_ day of January, 2008. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
David S. Dolowitz 
Dena C. Sarandos 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Respondent, Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on this (C? day of January, 2008,1 caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Appellees' Brief via First Class Mail, postage fully pre-
paid, to the following: 
Kim M. Luhn (Bar No. 5105) 
SCHMID & LUHN, P.C. 
331 South Rio Grande, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone:(801)531-8300 
Fax: 363-2420 
Jennifer D. Reyes (Bar No. 9004) 
DORIUS BOND REYES & LINARES 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Phone: (435) 723-5219 
Fax: (435) 723-5210 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Appellees 
and Cross-Appellant 
